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1. Introduction 
Income inequality is an important but incomplete measure of inequalities and 
differences characterising individuals in a society, since it goes very often together with 
inequality in other important aspects of human life, such as education, health, housing, 
and political participation. However, if research on income inequality has a long 
tradition (e.g., Lambert, 1993), economic literature has shown only recently a growing 
interest in other aspects of economic well-being. A burgeoning field is the measurement 
of health inequalities and the decomposition of their causes (e.g., Van Doorslaer and 
Koolman 2004, Van Doorslaer et al., 2004, Lua J., 2007, Chen at al., 2007). In 
particular, following the methodology proposed by Wagstaff et al. (2003), many studies 
focused on the decomposition of the causes of income related health inequalities within 
and across countries. On the contrary, economic research on educational inequality is 
quite modest, even though differences in educational attainment are considered an 
important determinant of aggregate wage inequality. An almost unique example is 
provided by Sahn and Younger (2007). They decompose within and between countries 
inequality using TIMSS data and find that, similarly to result on health inequality, 
within countries inequality is greater than the between component. 
While economists almost neglected the importance of understanding the causes of 
educational inequalities, sociologists extensively studied to which extent parental 
education, occupational status or class influence children’s educational achievements 
and attainment across countries and over time. For instance, Shavit and Blossfeld 
(1993) analyze the development of inequalities in educational attainment in the 20th 
century, concluding that the association between family background and educational 
attainment has remained stable over the 20th century for all countries they analyzed 
except for Sweden and the Netherlands. They investigate inequalities in transition rates 
by parental education and parental occupational status analysing single countries 
studies, with different dependent and explanatory variables for each country. The 
finding of persistent inequality has been contested by Breen et al. (2009), who - in 
contrast to the collection of single country studies - try to ensure a higher degree of 
comparability across countries by using surveys from nine European countries collected 
between 1970 and 2002 on men ages 30-69. They show that there was a clear decline in 
educational inequality in several countries over the course of the 20th century, measured 
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by the impact of one background characteristic only (social class) on attainment over 
time. Pfeffer (2008) measures inequality with mobility tables drawing on data from the 
‘International Adult Literacy Survey’. He finds a mostly stable strong association 
between parental education and the educational outcomes of their children for all 
nations. 
This paper tries to fill the gap in the economic literature, by expanding the discussion on 
inequality beyond income and health to a different dimension: education. As for health, 
educational inequality can be assessed on different dimensions: access to education, 
performance at school, and wages. We concentrate here on inequalities in educational 
outcomes, considering PISA test scores, and different European countries. In particular, 
we first decompose observed inequalities into their causes, and then analyse their 
evolution over time. In particular - following the same methodology proposed by 
Wagstaff et al. (2003) – we decompose change in educational inequalities on 
standardised tests into shares due to changes in the means and inequalities of the 
determinants of educational outcomes, and changes due to the rate of return of its 
determinants. Our results highlights that – besides parental background – also schools’ 
characteristics are important determinants of inequalities in achievements among 
students. Since schools’ characteristics are measured here with fixed effects, it is then 
crucial – in a policy perspective – to improve our understanding of the black box of 
schools, in order to identify which factors contribute more to raise students’ outcomes. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1 describes the 
methodology for the measurement of inequalities, for identify their causes and their 
evolution over time. Section 2 presents the data, while results are discussed in Section 3. 
A brief concluding section follows. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1. Measuring Inequalities 
 
Consider a measure of educational performance or educational outcome to assess the 
abilities of students. An educational system is characterized by inequalities in education 
if students with different socioeconomic status (SES) are characterized by different 
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outcomes (y). The measurement of these inequalities is generally based on concentration 
indices. Let us consider the distribution of the educational outcome measures by SES. 
The concentration curve, labeled L in Fig. 1, plots the cumulative proportion of the 
population, ranked by living standards, beginning with the most disadvantaged person 
and ending with the richest (x-axis), against the cumulative proportion of educational 
attainments (y-axis). If L overlaps the 45°-line, everyone enjoys the same educational 
performance irrespective of her living standards. Hence, the 45°-line can be labelled as 
the “line of equality”. On the contrary, if L lies below the 45°-line, inequalities in 
educational performance exist and favour the richer members of society. The further L 
lies from the diagonal, the greater the degree of inequality in educational performance 
across the income distribution. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
The concentration index, denoted by C, is defined as the ratio between the area amid L 
and the diagonal, and the area between the 45°-line. Since we are considering the 
proportion of individuals, and the proportion of outcomes, it can be easily shown that C 
simplifies to twice the area between L and the diagonal. More formally, C can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
∑
=
−=
N
i
iRN
C
1
12μ  
(1) 
 
where μ is the mean of educational performance, N is the number of individuals, and Ri 
is the fractional rank of the ith individual in the living standard distribution. 
In the case where there is no income-related inequality, the concentration curve overlaps 
with the equality line, and the concentration index takes a value of zero. If the 
educational measure is a “good” – like school attainment or achievement – inequalities 
to the disadvantage of the poor push C above zero and the concentration curve below 
the equality line. More precisely, if there are inequalities in the distribution of 
educational attainment, the concentration curve lies below (above) the equality line, and 
the concentration index takes a positive (negative) value. 
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2.2. Decomposing inequalities and their evolution over time 
 
To decompose the computed degree of inequality into the contributions of different 
explanatory factors, we consider here the methodology proposed by Wagstaff et al. 
(2003). In this case, one needs first to specify a linear additive regression model for 
educational performance on a set of k determinants (xk): 
 
∑ ++=
k
ikiki xy εβα  (2) 
 
where α and β's are coefficients to be estimated, and εi is a standard random disturbance 
term. It is then possible to decompose the concentration index of y by using the means 
and the concentration indices of the explanatory variables. In particular, from the 
previous equation the relationship between these indices can be written as: 
 
μμβ ε /)/(∑ += GCxC kk  (3) 
 
where μ is the mean of y, kx  is the sample mean of xk, Ck is the concentration index for 
xk, and Gε is a generalized CI for εi defined as ∑
=
=
n
i
iiRn
G
1
2 εε . In words, the 
concentration index C is equal to the sum of the concentration indices of the k 
regressors, weighted by the elasticity of y with respect to xk (evaluated at the sample 
mean). The residual component reflects the inequality in educational outcomes that is 
not explained by systematic variation across income groups in the determinants of 
outcomes xk. 
Inequalities can be also considered in their evolution over time. In this case, once 
decomposition of inequality in its observable components has been carried out in two 
different time periods (t-1 and t), it is interesting to decompose the observed differences 
over time in inequality in variations due to (i) the determinants of educational 
performance, and (ii) the impact of these determinants on performance. The approach 
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proposed by Wagstaff et al. (2003) consists in applying an Oaxaca-type decomposition 
to the expression of the concentration index C (Eq. 3). If we denote by μ
βη kkk x=  the 
elasticity of y with respect to xk at time t, and apply the Oaxaca’s method, we obtain: 
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which can be alternatively rewritten as: 
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The approach allows identifying for each xk the extent to which changes in educational 
inequalities are due to changes in inequalities in the determinants of educational 
performance (the first term on the right-hand side of each equation), rather then in their 
elasticities (the second term on the right-hand side). 
 
 
3. Data 
 
To assess educational inequalities and their causes, we need a measure of educational 
outcomes and a set of determinants of these educational outcomes. We consider here 
information provided by the Program for International Student Assessment, a study 
conducted by OECD every three years since 2000 in order to obtain an internationally 
comparable database on the competencies of 15 year-old students in reading, math, 
science and problem solving across countries. This is a widely used dataset for the 
analysis of educational performance. In particular, data used in this paper originate from 
two waves, 2000 and 2006. PISA’s target population were the 15-year-old students in 
each country. The students had to be enrolled in an educational institution, regardless of 
the grade level or type of institution. Target population was tested in each country. Most 
PISA countries employed a two-stage sampling technique. The first stage drew a 
(usually stratified) random sample of schools in which 15-year-old students were 
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enrolled, yielding a minimum sample of 150 schools per country. The second stage 
randomly sampled 35 of the 15-year-old students in each of these schools, with each 15-
year-old student in a school having equal selection probability. The survey is not 
structured as a panel; rather schools are randomly selected at every round. Since the 
schools selected are a representative sample of the school population, we argue that not 
having the same sample of schools in the two surveys is not a main issue for the 
analysis of the evolution of inequalities over time. 
The relevant notion of competencies assessed in PISA concerns knowledge and skills 
that can be applied in real world issues. In addition to the performance tests, students as 
well as schools' teacher heads answered respective questionnaires, yielding rich 
background information on students’ individual characteristics and family backgrounds, 
as well as on schools' resources endowment and educational practices.  
Unfortunately, some questions, and the scale used to measure some variables, change 
from one survey to the other reducing the number of explanatory variables that can be 
used by pooling the two surveys; this is especially true at the school level. For this 
reason, school level variables are accounted for by school fixed effects in the following 
analysis. The two surveys are merged using only variables included in both samples and 
measured with the same scale. 
Our measure for educational performance is the score obtained in the reading test. The 
measure for the socioeconomic status (the ranking variable) is the sum of the father and 
mother socioeconomic index of occupational status. Absent information on income at 
family level not collected by Pisa, the index captures the attributes of occupations that 
convert parents’ education into income.* Taking the sum rather than one parental 
indicator allows us to reduce problems involved with repetitive values of the indicator 
of economic welfare (Chen and Roy, 2008). 
The explanatory variables included in the analysis are: students’ gender, considering a 
dummy variable for females; students’ background, considering a set of dummies for 
the highest level of education completed by both parents available at three levels: 
recognised third level education (ISCED 5–7), second stage of secondary level of 
                                                 
* The index was derived using an optimal scaling procedure that assigns scores to each of 271 distinct 
occupation categories in such a way as to maximize the indirect effect of education on income through 
occupation and to minimize the direct effect of education on income, net of occupation (both effects being 
net of age). See Ganzeboom et al. (1992) for further details on this methodology. 
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education (ISCED 3) and less than second stage of secondary education (ISCED 0–2), 
treated as the omitted category; a dummy variable for not speaking the national 
language at home; a dummy for being born in another country; the grade at which the 
student is enrolled; and, finally, school fixed effects. Whilst the first set of variables 
captures characteristics at the individual and family level, school fixed effects capture 
characteristics at the school level. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. The evolution of inequalities 
 
Table 1 presents the concentration indices of the PISA reading test score by years and 
the difference over time for the following member states of the EU: France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom; we also include Norway, as a 
Nordic country. Students have been ranked by the sum of paternal and maternal 
socioeconomic index of occupational status, our measure of SES. The value of the 
concentration index is always positive, meaning that - as the measure is attainment - 
high scores are concentrated amongst the better off. The closest the values are to zero 
the less concentration in the distribution of read score is observed. Italy, Spain and 
Sweden present the lowest concentration of inequalities; Portugal and Greece the 
highest. A positive value of the difference over time means that concentration has 
increased and inequality rose, whilst the contrary holds when the value of the difference 
is negative. Germany displayed the highest reduction in inequalities, followed by Spain 
and Sweden. In France, Italy, Greece and Norway inequalities increased.† 
In what follows, we concentrate on the cases of Germany, France and Italy as they 
display the greatest change in inequality over the period under consideration. Figure 2 
presents the difference between the concentration curve and the equality line plotted 
against the cumulative percentage of the sample, ranked by the sum of paternal and 
                                                 
† To check the robustness of our results, we computed the concentration index ranking individuals by the 
sum of maternal and paternal educational level. Differences over time display the same variation in 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden; whilst results slightly change for the other countries. 
However, the educational level has only six categories, whilst the socioeconomic index of occupational 
status has 271 categories, allowing for a lower number of repetitive values in the ranking variable. 
Therefore, the concentration index computed using the socioeconomic index of occupational status seems 
more reliable than the one computed using parental education. 
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maternal socio-economic index of occupational status for Germany, France and Italy in 
2000 and 2006. If the concentration curve for one period lies everywhere closer to the x-
axis than the other, the first curve dominates the second and the ranking by degree of 
inequalities is unambiguous. Non-dominance emerges when the concentration curves 
cross. According to our estimates in Fig. 2, the concentration curve for Germany in 
2006 dominates the concentration curve for 2000, suggesting that inequalities have been 
reduced over time for each individual in the ith ranking from 2000 to 2006. The 
opposite occurred in France and Italy, where the concentration curves for 2000 
dominates the ones for 2006. This means that inequalities have increased over time in 
these two countries. 
 
[Table 1 and Figure 2 here] 
 
 
4.2. Regression results 
 
The production function regression results are presented in Table 2. The hypotheses of 
no school fixed effects are rejected based on the F-statistics for each country and both 
years. We test time invariant slope coefficients based on zero slope effects from 
regression on pooled sample which includes observation from the 2000 and the 2006 
surveys. The joint hypothesis of time-invariant slope coefficient is rejected at the 1% 
level for all the three countries. The mean of the school fixed effects increases 
considerably between 2000 and 2006 in Germany, whilst it decreases in France and 
Italy. Girls get lower reading scores than boys, and the gender gap widened over the 
period 2000-2006 in Germany and Italy, whilst it slightly narrowed in France. The 
estimated coefficients of maternal secondary and tertiary educational level (the omitted 
category is primary educational level) are positive across all countries in 2000 (though 
not significant for Italy), which suggest that higher maternal education is associated 
with higher reading test scores. However, the absolute values of the estimated 
coefficients have declined over time, and are not significant in France in 2006. The 
coefficients of paternal educational level are not highly significant in Germany and 
France in 2000, offsetting the lower impact of maternal education, whilst they are 
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positive and significant in Italy. Paternal education becomes positive and significant in 
Germany over time, whilst coefficients decline in France and Italy. Speaking at home a 
non national language has always a negative and significant effect on reading score, but 
whilst the gap falls in Germany and France, becoming not significant in France, it 
slightly rises in Italy. The coefficient estimates for the immigrant dummy variable are 
all significant and negative for all countries and years (although almost zero and not 
significant in Italy in 2000), which suggests that immigrants children achieved lower 
educational scores status. The declining pattern of the coefficient over time observed in 
Germany and France may reflect the increasing integration of immigrants in the school 
system, whilst the opposite is observed in Italy, where the gap significantly widened 
over the period under consideration. Being enrolled in higher grades is always 
associated with higher reading scores, with the effect increasing over time in France and 
Italy, and slightly decreasing in Germany. 
The results of the production function are qualitatively coherent with the existing 
burgeoning literature on PISA scores, although specifications usually differ from the 
one we adopt here with respect to the use of school level explanatory variables instead 
of school fixed effects. The impact of parental education on school performance has a 
steeper coefficient in Germany, whilst a flatter one in France and Italy, coherently with 
the findings in Baumert et al. (2003), Stanat (2003) and Entorf and Minoiu (2004). 
Similarly, the gap of students born in other countries when compared to the group of 
natives, and the gap between students with the national language as their major 
language spoken at home and students from foreign language speaking backgrounds is 
higher in Germany than in France and Italy (e.g., Entorf and Minoiu, 2004 and 
Ammermuelle, 2007).  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
 
4.3. Decomposition results 
 
Table 3, 4 and 5 present the decomposition for the two years and each country. The first 
two columns of the tables show the coefficients of the production function estimates as 
10
presented in Table 2. The third and fourth columns show the mean of the dependent 
variables for 2000 and 2006; the fifth and sixth columns present the elasticties 
μ
βη kkki x= , whilst the last two columns indicate the values of the concentration indices 
of the explanatory variables. A positive (negative) value of the concentration index 
suggests a pro-rich (pro-poor) distribution of the xk determinants of inequality. As 
expected, in almost all countries, parental secondary education shows a pro-poor 
distribution, while tertiary education highlights exactly the opposite. This suggests that 
parental background is better amongst the better-off. Notice that Italy is somewhat an 
exception, since in 2006 also parental secondary education shows a pro-rich 
distribution. Moreover, as for parental background, the level of pro-rich inequalities is 
higher in Italy than in other countries. 
Table 6 gives the decomposition results based on the Oaxaca decomposition, which are 
estimates of the contributions of explanatory variables to the concentration indices as 
well as the change between 2006 and 2000. Looking at the contribution of observable 
factors to the concentration index, being a girl has no contribution to the inequality in 
all three countries. Parental education disfavours the poor in the 2000 surveys, 
especially having a mother with tertiary education but the effect almost vanishes in the 
2006 survey. The effect of being born in another country or speaking a different 
language is null in all countries and survey, although speaking a different language 
slightly disfavours poor in Italy. Being enrolled in higher grade increases inequality 
towards poor. The effect is stronger in France, lower in Italy and almost null in 
Germany. 
An important source of inequality rises from school fixed effects. The effect is 
particularly considerable in France and Italy, and it rises over time. On the contrary, the 
effect is quite modest in Germany and it get to zero over time. The column headed 
“Change 2000-2006” shows that the reduction of inequality in Germany between 2000 
and 2006 was mainly due to changes at the school level, whilst on the contrary the same 
variable was responsible for the increase in inequality in Italy and France. 
School fixed effects clearly hide the impact of institutional differences. In Germany, the 
release of the PISA test results in 2001 - which indicated a mediocre academic 
performance of German students relative to other countries - prompted calls for 
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reforming the educational system. Changes involved the introduction of national 
standards of what students are expected to know at certain grades together with a system 
of monitoring and evaluation; the introduction of all-day schooling, which substituted a 
shorter schooling day; the adoption of new pedagogical initiatives to deal with 
heterogeneous abilities and to foster achievements (Ertl, 2006). The activation of these 
measures at the school level can be responsible for the estimated reduction in 
educational inequalities among German students. Also in Italy, in March 2003, the 
Parliament approved a reform of the schools system to improve the performance of the 
Italian students. School fixed effects, however, are likely to veil here more cross-
regional differences rather than cross-school differences. The most important innovation 
introduced by the law was the reduction of the age limits for compulsory education; a 
higher degree of differentiation at the upper secondary school level, achieved by 
splitting the school system into two tracks, the generalist and the vocational one; finally, 
a reduction of the age of access to primary school. This last change is particularly 
important as it anticipates the age at which students decide in which track to enrol, 
strengthening the parental role in the choice of the educational career. The 
implementation of the reform required a few years, however, among the first measures 
undertaken, there is a substantial reduction of school hours at the secondary school 
level, probably justified by the preoccupation of cutting the cost associated with the 
provision of public education. 15-years old Italian students in the 2006 survey were 
indeed exposed to less hours of teaching than students in the 2000 survey, before the 
reform was implemented.  
The reform of the school system in France was defined by the Fillon Law, approved in 
2005, which introduced a core knowledge for certain subjects. This includes French, 
mathematics, a foreign language, humanistic and scientific culture, communication and 
information; arts subjects are instead excluded. This requirement would be an 
educational minimum that all pupils would be supposed to receive. The main opposition 
to the law argued that it would have planned a two-tier education in which the majority 
will receive the basic minimum, while a quality education will be the preserve of the 
elite. 
What the decomposition in Table 6 does not enable us to see is how far these changes 
are due to changes in elasticities rather than changes in inequalities. The Oaxaca 
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decomposition in Table 7 answers to this question. For a given observable variable, the 
columns with header “ΔC×η” are the contributions of the respective explanatory 
variable to the change in inequality in the total concentration index due to the change of 
the concentration index of the explanatory variable itself, and the columns with header 
“Δη×C” indicate the contribution due to the change in elasticity of the explanatory 
variable. The column “Total” corresponds to the sum of the two components and 
coincides with the column headed “Change” in Table 6. Finally the “%” column 
computes the relative contribution of each observable variable to the total concentration. 
Results first suggest the existence of different patterns for the three countries. In 
Germany, changes in C (the inequalities in the determinants) accounts for the observed 
overall decline in inequalities, with elasticities that slightly increase during the period. 
On the contrary, in France and Italy, the observed increase in educational inequalities is 
due to an increase in C less than compensated by a reduction in the elasticities η. In 
France, the two effects are almost of the same magnitude and opposite direction, 
although a slightly worsening in inequalities makes the effect of the inequalities in the 
covariates prevailing. In Italy, the increase in C is almost double the reduction estimated 
for η. Second, in all countries, the contribution of school fixed effects to ΔC is the 
greatest among the covariates. But, again, the sign is different: in Germany, inequalities 
between schools decreased (most probably as an effect of the reform implemented); in 
Italy and France, we observe an opposite evolution over time. Third, the negative 
impact on inequalities of an increase in ΔC for school fixed effects is counterbalanced 
in France by a reduction, similar in magnitude, in the elasticities of school fixed effects, 
which take the lions’ share also in Δη. Hence, overall results for France are explained 
by an increase in between-schools inequalities less than compensated by a reduction in 
the importance of schools in the educational process; the mean of school fixed effects is 
actually negative in France in 2006. Fourth, in Germany and in Italy, school fixed 
effects are not the single most important factor in contributing to explain change in 
elasticities; also parental education matters. As for school fixed effects, differences in 
sign emerge between Germany (which experienced an increase) and Italy (which 
experienced a decrease) for the change in elasticities. As for parental education, in 
Germany the role of mother tertiary education and father secondary education 
decreased, whilst the role of mother secondary education and father tertiary education 
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increased. In Italy, we observe a significant reduction in the elasticity of father tertiary 
education. It is difficult to find explanations for the observed patterns. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper analyse educational inequalities by considering PISA test scores. We focus 
on a number of different European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and UK) and measure inequalities in 2000 and 2006. Our 
results suggest that inequalities have been reducing only in Germany and Spain, while 
they increase in all remaining countries. We then concentrate on France, Germany and 
Italy, and decompose observed inequalities into their causes, and analyse their evolution 
over time. In particular - following the same methodology proposed by Wagstaff et al. 
(2003) – we decompose change in educational inequalities on standardised tests into 
shares due to changes in the means and inequalities of the determinants of educational 
outcomes, and changes due to the rate of return of its determinants. Our results 
highlights that – besides parental background – also schools’ characteristics are 
important determinants of inequalities in achievements among students. Decomposition 
allows policy makers to target areas that may make the largest contribution to reducing 
educational inequalities. As schools are treated in this exercise as fixed effects, it is 
crucial in a policy perspective to open the black box of schools, in order to understand 
what the most important determinants of inequalities between schools are. This is left 
for future research. 
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Figure 1. Concentration Curve 
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Figure 2. Difference between the concentration curve and the equality line for the 
reading score, 2000 and 2006 
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Table 1. Concentration index, 2000 and 2006 (std. dev. in brackets) 
 
  
2006 2000 Difference 
France 0.0380 0.0327 0.0053 
  [0.0018] [0.0016]   
Germany 0.0348 0.0472 -0.0124 
  [0.0020] [0.0023]   
Italy 0.0288 0.0233 0.0055 
  [0.0016] [0.0019]   
Greece 0.0444 0.0390 0.0054 
  [0.0022] [0.0024]   
Norway 0.0359 0.0311 0.0048 
  [0.0018] [0.0019]   
Portugal 0.0442 0.0438 0.0005 
  [0.0023] [0.0020]   
Spain 0.0289 0.0332 -0.0043 
  [0.0017] [0.0016]   
Sweden 0.0330 0.0303 0.0026 
  [0.0018] [0.0016]   
Great Britain 0.0376 0.0374 0.0002 
  [0.0015] [0.0016]   
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Table 2. Production function (dependent variable: read score) 
  Germany France Italy 
  2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 
Female -15.998 -27.904 -16.156 -15.341 -15.422 -18.652 
  [2.157]** [2.100]** [2.037]** [2.199]** [2.238]** [1.911]** 
Mother second educ 35.744 17.171 10.244 3.409 5.401 4.48 
  [10.847]** [3.426]** [4.423]* [3.098] [3.213] [1.962]* 
Mother tertiary educ 47.695 21.447 14.464 -1.318 5.52 2.166 
  [11.154]** [3.757** [4.646]** [3.635] [3.512] [2.923] 
Father second educ -18.563 10.144 5.726 0.357 8.248 0.784 
  [9.423]* [3.466]** [4.026] [2.935] [3.342]* [1.942] 
Father tertiary educ -18.915 5.251 6.516 2.235 8.534 -4.298 
  [10.003] [3.552] [4.199] [3.455] [3.710]* [2.930] 
Not national language spoken at home -26.954 -12.339 -13.667 -1.41 -7.427 -10.36 
  (7.640)** (4.813)* [4.944]** [6.088] [3.072]* [2.591]** 
Born in another country -24.568 -14.161 -8.784 -5.303 0.892 -7.023 
  [3.577]** [3.165]** [2.547]** [2.840] [4.214] [2.948]* 
Grade  37.884 31.611 48.144 55.791 35.098 38.657 
  [1.826]** [1.753]** [2.866]** [3.626]** [2.456]** [2.349]** 
School fixed effects 149.681 217.403 44.758 -30.127 140.105 101.171 
  [18.248]** [16.352]** [27.73] [35.024] [24.504]** [23.257]** 
Observations 4161.000 3907.000 4135 3816 4749 20581 
R-squared 0.650 0.690 0.57 0.62 0.56 0.56 
F school fixed effects=0 17.536 22.151 6.382 13.453 21.527 22.216 
Degree of freedom for fixed effect=0 3935 3682 3950 3649 4570 19775 
p for f-test for school fixed effects=0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F test: No change in slope coefficients 651.31 2.95 5.75 
Prob > F 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Test is 
based on common fixed effects obtained from regressions on pooled sample 
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Table 3. Germany - Inequality Decomposition for 2000 and 2006 
  Coefficients Mean Elasticities 
Concentration 
indices 
  2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 
Mean read score     483.988 500.086         
Female -15.998 -27.904 0.498 0.517 -0.016 -0.029 0.029 0.044 
Mother second educ 35.744 17.171 0.650 0.538 0.048 0.018 -0.086 -0.058 
Mother tertiary educ 47.695 21.447 0.302 0.287 0.030 0.012 0.160 0.108 
Father second educ -18.563 10.144 0.524 0.422 -0.020 0.009 -0.147 -0.079 
Father tertiary educ -18.915 5.251 0.445 0.406 -0.017 0.004 0.171 0.103 
Not national language spoken at 
home -26.954 -12.339 0.072 0.064 -0.004 -0.002 0.025 -0.008 
Born in another country -24.568 -14.161 0.210 0.165 -0.011 -0.005 -0.013 -0.042 
Grade  37.884 31.611 9.064 9.164 0.709 0.579 0.000 -0.001 
School fixed effects 149.681 217.403 158.184 221.297 0.327 0.457 0.018 -0.001 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. France - Inequality Decomposition for 2000 and 2006 
  Coefficients Mean Elasticities 
Concentration 
indices 
  2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 
Mean read score     504.3838 491.1547         
Female -16.156 -15.341 0.484 0.487 -0.015 -0.015 0.014 0.018 
Mother second educ 10.244 3.409 0.446 0.482 0.009 0.004 -0.222 -0.084 
Mother tertiary educ 14.464 -1.318 0.474 0.308 0.014 -0.001 0.258 0.339 
Father second educ 5.726 0.357 0.457 0.449 0.005 0.000 -0.219 -0.123 
Father tertiary educ 6.516 2.235 0.462 0.328 0.006 0.002 0.270 0.380 
Not national language spoken at 
home -13.667 -1.410 0.049 0.055 -0.001 0.000 -0.093 -0.079 
Born in another country -8.784 -5.303 0.251 0.232 -0.004 -0.003 -0.020 0.053 
Grade  48.144 55.791 9.510 9.586 0.908 1.088 0.012 0.011 
School fixed effects 44.758 -30.127 53.897 -28.963 0.107 -0.059 0.135 -0.332 
 
 
Table 5. Italy - Inequality Decomposition for 2000 and 2006 
  Coefficients Mean Elasticities 
Concentration 
indices 
  2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 
Mean read score     487.3614 470.7624         
Female -15.422 -18.652 0.503 0.496 -0.016 -0.020 0.007 0.014 
Mother second educ 5.401 4.480 0.430 0.421 0.005 0.004 -0.273 0.009 
Mother tertiary educ 5.520 2.166 0.441 0.191 0.005 0.001 0.349 0.562 
Father second educ 8.248 0.784 0.445 0.406 0.008 0.001 -0.262 0.008 
Father tertiary educ 8.534 -4.298 0.441 0.193 0.008 -0.002 0.364 0.586 
Not national language spoken at 
home -7.427 -10.360 0.170 0.125 -0.003 -0.003 -0.257 -0.250 
Born in another country 0.892 -7.023 0.059 0.101 0.000 -0.002 0.040 -0.113 
Grade  35.098 38.657 9.862 9.846 0.710 0.809 0.005 0.006 
School fixed effects 140.105 101.171 135.974 106.691 0.279 0.227 0.059 0.096 
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Table 6. Contribution of observables and change between 2000 and 2006 
  Contribution to C Change 2006 - 2000 
  Germany France Italy Germany France Italy 
  2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006       
Female -0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0002 
Mother second educ -0.0041 -0.0011 -0.0020 -0.0003 -0.0013 0.0000 0.0031 0.0017 0.0013 
Mother tertiary educ 0.0047 0.0013 0.0035 -0.0003 0.0017 0.0005 -0.0034 -0.0038 -0.0012 
Father second educ 0.0030 -0.0007 -0.0011 0.0000 -0.0020 0.0000 -0.0036 0.0011 0.0020 
Father tertiary educ -0.0030 0.0004 0.0016 0.0007 0.0028 -0.0010 0.0034 -0.0009 -0.0038 
Not national language spoken at 
home -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 
Born in another country 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 
Grade  -0.0002 -0.0008 0.0110 0.0116 0.0036 0.0045 -0.0006 0.0006 0.0008 
School fixed effects 0.0058 -0.0004 0.0144 0.0196 0.0164 0.0219 -0.0062 0.0052 0.0055 
"Residual" -0.0030 -0.0067 0.0053 0.0072 0.0015 0.0023 -0.0038 0.0019 0.0008 
Total 0.0028 -0.0090 0.0327 0.0380 0.0233 0.0287 -0.0118 0.0053 0.0054 
 
Table 7. Oaxaca-type decompositions for change in inequality 2000 and 2006 
  Germany France Italy 
  ΔC×η Δη×C Total % ΔC×η Δη×C Total % ΔC×η Δη×C Total % 
Female -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0008 9.88 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -1.69 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 -3.46 
Mother second educ 0.0005 0.0025 0.0031 -38.16 0.0005 0.0012 0.0017 49.76 0.0011 0.0002 0.0013 29.35 
Mother tertiary educ -0.0006 -0.0028 -0.0034 42.67 -0.0001 -0.0038 -0.0038 -112.00 0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0012 -27.48 
Father second educ 0.0006 -0.0042 -0.0036 45.26 0.0000 0.0011 0.0011 32.50 0.0002 0.0018 0.0020 43.50 
Father tertiary educ -0.0003 0.0037 0.0034 -42.56 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0009 -27.43 -0.0004 -0.0035 -0.0038 -84.61 
Not national language spoken at 
home 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -1.41 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -3.21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.51 
Born in another country 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.73 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 -6.42 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002 3.65 
Grade  -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0006 7.48 -0.0016 0.0022 0.0006 17.07 0.0003 0.0005 0.0008 18.45 
School fixed effects -0.0085 0.0023 -0.0062 77.57 0.0275 -0.0223 0.0052 151.42 0.0085 -0.0031 0.0055 120.09 
"Residual"     -0.0038 46.81     0.0019 55.90     0.0008 18.22 
Total -0.0092 0.0012 -0.0080   0.0263 -0.0229 0.0034   0.0101 -0.0055 0.0045   
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